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Non-technical summary: In recent decades, German industry-level bargain-
ing has often been blamed for the deterioration of firms’ competitiveness, as centrally
negotiated wages are perceived to be particularly harmful to those firms who per-
form below the industry average. However, the extent to which a uniform industry
wage deteriorates the position of less successful firms ultimately depends on the de-
gree to which a centralised union internalises negative implications for below-average
performing firms. If, for example, an industry-level union takes into account the job
losses a wage increase produces in less successful firms, this may induce the union to
moderate its wage demands. Clearly, the need to do so should critically depend on
the variability in firm performance within the industry under consideration. As there
is surprisingly little evidence on how the extent of firm heterogeneity affects centrally
negotiated union wages, the aim of this paper is to study the relationship between
wages and the degree of firm heterogeneity in a given industry under different wage
setting structures. To provide some theoretical guidance, we first set up a simple
theoretical model that analyses the sensitivity of wages to the variability in pro-
ductivity conditions in a unionsised oligopoly framework. The model distinguishes
centralised and decentralised wage determination. The theoretical results predict
wages to be negatively associated with the degree of firm heterogeneity under cen-
tralised wage-setting, as unions internalise negative externalities of a wage increase
for low-productivity firms. We test this prediction using a linked employer-employee
panel data set from the German mining and manufacturing sector. Consistent with
our hypotheses, the empirical results suggest that under industry-level bargaining
workers in more heterogeneous sectors receive lower wages than workers in more
homogeneous sectors. In contrast, the degree of firm heterogeneity is found to have
no negative impact on wages in uncovered firms and under firm-level contracts.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze: In der wirtschaftspolitischen Diskussion mussten
sich Fla¨chentarifvertra¨ge ha¨ufig dem Vorwurf aussetzen, die Wettbewerbsfa¨higkeit
insbesondere unterdurchschnittlich produktiver Unternehmen zu beeintra¨chtigen.
Das Ausmaß negativer Konsequenzen fu¨r schwa¨chere Unternehmen ha¨ngt jedoch
nicht zuletzt davon ab, ob negative Externalita¨ten hoher Lohnabschlu¨sse fu¨r un-
terdurchschnittlich produktive Unternehmen bei den Verhandlungen beru¨cksichtigt
werden. Sofern Bescha¨ftigungsverluste in schwa¨cheren Unternehmen internalisiert
werden, ist denkbar, dass dies zu moderateren Lohnforderungen seitens der Gew-
erkschaften fu¨hrt. Das Ausmaß der Ru¨cksichtnahme auf schwa¨chere Unternehmen
sollte hierbei maßgeblich von der Heterogenita¨t der Unternehmen in der betreffenden
Branche abha¨ngen. Obwohl eine umfangreiche Literatur zum Zusammenhang zwis-
chen Verhandlungsstruktur und Lohnniveau existiert, gibt es in der empirischen
Literatur bislang kaum Evidenz dafu¨r, inwiefern eine gro¨ßere Branchenheterogenita¨t
zu moderateren Lohnabschlu¨ssen fu¨hrt. Ziel der vorliegenden Studie ist es daher,
den Zusammenhang zwischen Branchenheterogenita¨t und Lo¨hnen zu analysieren.
Um testbare Hypothesen abzuleiten, wird zuna¨chst in einem Oligopolmodell mit
endogenen Lo¨hnen der Zusammenhang zwischen Branchenheterogenita¨t und gle-
ichgewichtigen Lo¨hnen hergeleitet. In dem Modellrahmen wird zwischen zentral-
isierter und dezentralisierter Lohnsetzung unterschieden. Wa¨hrend sich den theo-
retischen Ergebnissen zufolge unter zentralisierter Lohnfindung ein negativer Zusam-
menhang zwischen Branchenheterogenita¨t und gleichgewichtigen Lo¨hnen ergibt, hat
das Ausmaß der Heterogenita¨t unter dezentralisierten Abschlu¨ssen keinen Einfluss
auf die Lo¨hne. Die aus dem theoretischen Modellrahmen abgeleiteten Hypothe-
sen werden schließlich auf Basis deutscher Linked Employer-Employee Paneldaten
getestet. Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass - konsistent mit den theoretischen
U¨berlegungen - unter Fla¨chentarifvertra¨gen Individuen in heterogeneren Branchen
niedrigere Lo¨hne erhalten als Individuen in homogeneren Sektoren. Im Gegensatz
dazu la¨sst sich - ebenfalls konsistent mit den abgeleiteten Hypothesen - kein sig-
nifikanter Zusammenhang zwischen Branchenheterogenita¨t und Lo¨hnen unter Fir-
mentarifvertra¨gen und in nicht tarifgebundenen Unternehmen nachweisen.
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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between wages and the degree of firm
heterogeneity in a given industry under different wage setting structures. To
derive testable hypotheses, we set up a theoretical model that analyses the
sensitivity of wages to the variability in productivity conditions in a union-
sised oligopoly framework. The model distinguishes centralised and decen-
tralised wage determination. The theoretical results predict wages to be
negatively associated with the degree of firm heterogeneity under centralised
wage-setting, as unions internalise negative externalities of a wage increase
for low-productivity firms. We test this prediction using a linked employer-
employee panel data set from the German mining and manufacturing sec-
tor. Consistent with our hypotheses, the empirical results suggest that under
industry-level bargaining workers in more heterogeneous sectors receive lower
wages than workers in more homogeneous sectors. In contrast, the degree of
firm heterogeneity is found to have no negative impact on wages in uncovered
firms and under firm-level contracts.
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1 Introduction
The degree of bargaining centralisation has long been recognised as an important
determinant of macroeconomic performance and economic competitiveness. The
economic rationale behind this idea dates back to the seminal work by Calmfors
and Driffill (1988), who established the hypothesis of a hump-shaped relationship
between centralisation and wages. The authors argue that centralised wage setting,
on the one hand, may enable unions to secure higher wages, since they internalise
positive externalities from demand spill-overs across firms producing substitutable
goods. On the other hand, centralised bargaining may induce unions to take into
account negative price externalities since the impact of the negotiated wage on the
general consumption price-level becomes larger as centralisation increases. Further
important negative externalities that are likely to be internalised by centralised
unions include adverse employment prospects for unemployed outsiders (see e.g.
Moene et al. 1993, Fitzenberger and Franz 1999) as well as fiscal externalities
(Calmfors 2001).
While much of this theoretical literature has focused on the impact of centralisa-
tion on wage outcomes in homogeneous firms, very few studies explicitly address the
issue of firm heterogeneity.1 This is particularly surprising as an important argument
against bargaining centralisation typically refers to the insensitivity of centrally ne-
gotiated wages to local firm conditions. This view is confirmed by recent empirical
evidence for Germany supporting the view that wage agreements on sectoral and
regional levels (Fla¨chentarifvertra¨ge) suppress firm wage differentials across hetero-
geneous firms (Guertzgen 2005). Against this background, German industry-level
bargaining has often been blamed for the deterioration of firms’ competitiveness, as
centrally negotiated wages are perceived to be particularly harmful to those firms
who perform below the industry average (see e.g. Hassel and Schulten 1998, German
Council of Economic Experts 2002, 2005).
However, the extent to which a uniform industry wage deteriorates the posi-
tion of less successful firms ultimately depends on the degree to which a centralised
union internalises negative implications for below-average performing firms. If, for
example, an industry-level union takes into account the job losses a wage increase
1 Other authors who have analysed the impact of bargaining centralisation on wage outcomes
are e.g. Davidson (1988), Dowrick (1989) and Cahuc and Zylberberg (1991) and Hoel (1991).
Among the few studies that address the issue of firm heterogeneity are the analyses by Barth and
Zweimu¨ller (1995) and Haucap and Wey (2004), who analyse the impact of centralisation on firm
wage differentials between two heterogeneous firms.
produces in less successful firms, this may induce the union to moderate its wage de-
mands. Clearly, the need to do so should critically depend on the variability in firm
performance within the industry under consideration. While the impact of collec-
tive bargaining coverage on wage outcomes in Germany has received much attention
by researchers (Stephan and Gerlach 2005, Guertzgen 2006, Kohn and Lembcke
2007, Fitzenberger et al. 2008), there is surprisingly little evidence on how the ex-
tent of firm heterogeneity affects centrally negotiated union wages. The purpose of
the present paper is to fill in this gap by examining the relationship between wage
outcomes and the degree of firm heterogeneity under different bargaining regimes.
To formalise our main argument, we first set up a theoretical model that analyses
the sensitivity of wages to the variability in productivity conditions in a unionsised
oligopoly framework. The model distinguishes centralised and decentralised wage
determination. The core result of the model establishes a negative association be-
tween wages and the degree of firm heterogeneity under centralised wage-setting.
The basic mechanism at work is that in more heterogeneous industries a centralised
union has the incentive to settle for a lower wage, in order to prevent jobs losses in
low-productivity firms.
In a second step, we test our predictions using a linked employer-employee panel
data set from the German mining and manufacturing sector. This data set is par-
ticularly useful for our purposes as it provides detailed information on whether an
establishment is subject to an industry-wide wage agreement, a firm-specific wage
agreement or to no wage agreement at all. Moreover, the data allow us to retrieve a
productivity measure at the firm level, which enables us to construct a measure for
the industry-wide dispersion of productivity conditions as a proxy for the degree of
firm heterogeneity.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the institutional back-
ground of German wage determination is presented in Section 2. Section 3 sets up
the theoretical model that analyses the sensitivity of wages to the degree of firm
heterogeneity under different wage-setting regimes. From this we derive testable
hypotheses for the empirical analysis in Section 4. While Section 4.1. presents the
general empirical model, Section 4.2. describes the data set and the main variables
used in the empirical analysis. Section 4.3. reports the estimation results. The final
Section 5 concludes.
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2 Institutional Background
In Germany, basically three forms of wage determination may be distinguished: cen-
tral collective wage agreements, firm-specific collective wage agreements as well as
wage determination without any collective bargaining coverage. Within the sys-
tem of wage bargaining, regional and industry-wide collective wage agreements
(Fla¨chentarifvertra¨ge) rank among the most important contract type. These agree-
ments are negotiated between an industry-specific trade union and an employers’
association. In general, bargained wages under industry-level contracts merely rep-
resent a lower bound on wages, i.e. firms are free to pay wages above the negotiated
rate. However, in contrast to other European countries, there is no two-tier system
with subsequent firm-level agreements, since higher wages than those stipulated in
the centralised agreement are paid on a voluntary basis and do not arise from a
legally binding supplementary firm-level contract. Moreover, flexibility provisions
in central agreements may also allow for a downward adjustment of wages. These
flexibility provisions, whose most important components may be summarised as opt-
out clauses and hardship clauses, generally delegate issues that are usually specified
in the central agreement to the plant-level. In particular, such clauses may allow
firms to settle for wages below those set at the industry-level. Even though con-
tractual opt-out and hardship clauses have become an important (formal) element
of centralised agreements, empirical evidence on the use of such clauses indicates
that only a very small fraction of firms appears to exploit these clauses (see e.g.,
Franz and Pfeiffer 2003, Guertzgen 2005, Kohaut and Schnabel 2007, Heinbach and
Schro¨pfer 2008).
Second, firms who are not party to centralised agreements may be engaged in
bilateral negotiations with a trade union and conclude firm-specific agreements. A
noteworthy feature of those agreements is that they are concluded by industry-
specific trade unions and do not involve uncoordinated wage bargaining of indepen-
dent firm-specific unions. That is, decentralisation here merely refers to the level of
bargaining and not to the degree of coordination. Third, there is wage determina-
tion without any bargaining coverage. In firms that are not covered by an collective
agreement wage determination may either take the form of individual wage contracts
or of plant-specific agreements (Betriebsvereinbarungen) between works councils and
the management.2 In contrast to firm-specific collective wage agreements, this kind
2 According to the German Works Constitution Act, works councils are not allowed to negotiate
about issues that are normally dealt with in collective agreements, even in firms that are not parties
of a collective agreement. In practice, however, works councils may be expected to play a crucial
role in wage determination (see e.g. Hu¨bler and Jirjahn 2003).
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of wage determination can be characterised as decentralised and uncoordinated.
3 Theoretical Framework
The purpose of the present section is to derive testable hypotheses about the re-
lationship between wages and the degree of firm heterogeneity within a particular
industry. To formalise the idea that collective bargaining coverage may affect the re-
lationship between wages and the degree of firm heterogeneity, we employ a unionised
oligopoly framework with heterogeneous firms and different wage-setting structures.
The wage-setting structures and their empirical counterparts are illustrated in Table
1.
Table 1: Wage setting structures
Abbr. Wage-setting structure Empirical counterpart
(D) Decentralised and uncoordinated No bargaining coverage
(I) Decentralised and coordinated Firm-specific collective agreement
(Intermediate centralised)
(C) Centralised and coordinated Industry-wide collective agreement
As to the empirical counterparts, our data allow us to distinguish industry-level
contracts, firm-level contracts and no coverage. To mirror the institutional variety
reflected in our data, we therefore distinguish three theoretical wage setting struc-
tures: Regime (D) reflects a decentralised and uncoordinated wage-setting struc-
ture, with wages being determined non-cooperatively at the firm level. This regime
is assumed to represent the wage determination process in firms without collective
bargaining coverage.3 Regime (I) represents an intermediate centralised structure
with one encompassing industry union which can adjust wages to the firm level.
This regime is intended to match firm-specific collective contracts, since it reflects
the coordinated nature and the decentralised level of wage determination. Note
that, empirically, this regime may also refer to central agreements with the adop-
tion of flexibility provisions. However, as the data used in this study unfortunately
lack explicit information on the use of these provisions, we are not able to distin-
3 Although we are aware of the fact that regime (D) assuming uncoordinated union wage-setting
does not exactly match the institutional conditions in firms without any bargaining coverage, we
consider it here as a benchmark scenario for the following two reasons. First, it reflects the
uncoordinated nature of wage determination in firms without any bargaining coverage. Second, at
least in codetermined firms a collective wage determination framework appears to be appropriate
since empirical evidence suggests that German works councils affect wage outcomes even in firms
that are not covered by a collective wage contract (Hu¨bler and Jirjahn 2003).
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guish industry-level contracts with and without opt-out clauses.4 Finally, regime
(C) refers to a completely centralised structure, where an industry union sets one
uniform wage for the entire industry. As to its empirical counterpart, regime (C) is
assumed to reflect a central wage agreement without any adoption of hardship or
opening clauses.
3.1 The Model
The theoretical model builds upon the modelling framework by Haucap and Wey
(2004) who consider a unionised Cournot oligopoly with two heterogeneous firms.
We extend their duopoly model to an n-firm oligopoly to derive as general conclu-
sions as possible. We assume a right-to-manage framework where unions set wages
and firms unilaterally decide on the employment level. Heterogeneity among firms
is introduced by imposing heterogeneous labour productivities of otherwise homo-
geneous labour.
More specifically, consider a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly with n firms each
producing output qi, i = 1, ..., n. Product demand is assumed to be linear with
P = a− b
n∑
i=1
qi, (1)
where P is the homogeneous good price. Firms produce with a constant marginal
product of homogeneous labour, the only variable factor of production. To generate
heterogeneity in firms’ productivity, suppose that each firm i requires ci units of
labour to produce a unit of the homogeneous good, so that labour demand li equals
ciqi. With wi denoting the wage each firm i has to pay for one unit of labour,
marginal costs are therefore ciwi. Firms’ profit functions take the form
pii = (a− b
n∑
j=1
qj)qi − qiciwi, i = 1, ..., n. (2)
Maximising each firm’s profit function for given wages wi and given ci with re-
spect to qi, taking qj, j 6= i, as given yields equilibrium quantities
qi =
a− nciwi +
∑
j 6=i cjwj
b(n+ 1)
, i = 1, ..., n. (3)
Industry output Q is given by
4 Information on the existence and use of opt-out clauses under industry-level contracts is
only available for the year 2005. As this wave of the data set will be exploited for retrospective
information to construct a firm performance measure in 2004, we are not able to exploit information
on the use of these clauses.
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Q =
na− n∑ni=1 ciwi + (n− 1)∑ni=1 ciwi
b(n+ 1)
=
na−∑ni=1 ciwi
b(n+ 1)
. (4)
A right-to-manage framework results in a two-stage game structure, with unions
setting optimal wages in the first stage of the game while anticipating the Cournot
equilibrium quantities from the second stage. Distinguishing three wage-setting
regimes as outlined above gives rise to the following wage-setting games:
1. Decentralisation (D): Completely decentralised wage-setting takes place with
n firm-unions each setting its optimal (firm-specific) wage independently from
the other (n− 1) unions, taking their wages as given.
2. Complete centralisation (C): Centralised wage-setting takes place with one
industry-wide union representing the interests of all workers in the industry
and setting a uniform wage for all n firms.
3. Intermediate centralisation (I): Under intermediate centralised wage-setting
one industry-wide union settles for firm-specific wages while coordinating the
wage demands in all firms of the industry.
Unions are assumed to maximise the wage bill. Equilibrium wages are therefore
solutions of the following programs
wi = argmax
wi
U ri (w1, ..., wn) s.t. eq. (3), (5)
with r = D, I, C. More specifically, for the different union structures we have
UDi (w1, ..., wn) = (wi − w)li, i = 1, ..., n, (6)
U I(w1, ..., wn) =
n∑
i=1
(wi − w)li, (7)
and
UC(w1, ..., wn) =
n∑
i=1
(w − w)li, (8)
with w denoting the alternative wage level, which workers may expect to earn else-
where in the economy. This gives rise to n first-order conditions in the decentralised
and intermediate centralised regime (D) and (I) and to one first-order condition in
the completely centralised case (C).
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3.2 Theoretical Results
Proposition 1 Under the three wage-setting structures we obtain the following equi-
librium wage outcomes:
(i)
wDi =
(2n+ 1)a/ci + nw [(n+ 1) + n(c/ci)]
(n+ 1)(2n+ 1)
, i = 1, ..., n, (9)
(ii)
wIi =
w
2
+
a
2ci
, i = 1, ..., n, (10)
(iii)
wC =
w
2
+
a
2 [(n+ 1)V AR(c)/c+ c]
, (11)
where c = 1
n
∑n
j=1 cj denotes the average labour-input coefficient, that is the average
inverse labour productivity in the industry and V AR(c) = 1
n
∑n
j=1(cj−c)2 represents
a measure of the industry-wide dispersion of ci.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 provides a generalisation of a variety of results that have already
been derived for a homogeneous oligopoly.5 Eqs. (9) and (10) show that the firm-
specific wage outcomes are a decreasing function of the firm-specific labour-input
coefficients ci, if wages are determined in the decentralised and intermediate cen-
tralised wage-setting regime. The reason is that the union’s marginal cost of a wage
increase, ∂li/∂wi, unambiguously increases with ci. That is the higher the labour-
input coefficient the larger is the incentive to lower the firm-specific wage wi in order
to improve firm’s i competitive position in the product market. Conversely, if ci de-
creases, this induces unions in regimes (D) and (I) to settle for a higher wage as
the marginal cost of a wage increase in terms of foregone employment is reduced.
Moreover, in the decentralised regime (D) the firm-specific wage is the higher the
lower firm’s i labour-input coefficient ci relative to the industry average, c. The
reason is that in the decentralised case unions generally have an incentive to cut
wages in order to gain a larger share of industry employment. A low average indus-
try productivity lowers this incentive by reducing the competitive pressure on firm
i, thereby enabling its union to settle for a higher wage. Note that this is not the
case in the intermediate centralised regime (I), where the wage is solely a function
5 See e.g. Corneo (1995) among others, who derives expressions for wCi and w
D
i under the
assumption ci = 1 for all i. Moreover, our analysis generalises the results of Haucap and Wey
(2004), who consider the case n = 2 , c1 = (1− d) and c2 = 1.
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of each firm’s own labour-input coefficient ci. The reason is that the competitive
mechanism being at work in the decentralised regime completely disappears with
an industry-wide union, which fully internalises positive externalities arising from
wage increases in firm i for the employment level in the rival firms j, j 6= i.
Finally, from eq. (11) it can be seen that the completely centralised regime (C)
suppresses any wage response to firm-specific productivity conditions, which simply
arises from the assumption that the uniform industry wage applies to all firms in the
industry. Instead, the uniform industry-wage is shown to be a function of the average
industry labour-input coefficient c and the variability in productivity conditions,
as measured by the industry-wide dispersion of the inverse labour productivity ci,
V AR(c). Note that in a homogeneous industry with all firms exhibiting an identical
labour-input-coefficient c, the uniform industry wage reduces to
wC =
w
2
+
a
2c
. (12)
Compared to the wage outcome in a homogeneous industry with all firms ex-
hibiting an identical labour-input-coefficient c, an industry union in a heterogeneous
industry therefore settles for a lower wage, since V AR(c) > 0. The intuition behind
this result is that an industry-union setting a uniform industry-wage takes into ac-
count the marginal cost of a wage increase for all firms in the industry, that is also
for those firms which have a labour-input coefficient above the average. Employment
in those firms is affected more than proportionally negatively after a given wage in-
crease. The reason is that a wage increase does not only reduce the output level to
a larger extent, but also implies for a given output reduction a higher employment
loss (since li = ciqi). In contrast, the heterogeneity in firm-level productivity has no
impact on wage outcomes in regimes (D) and (I) as these regimes allow wages to
respond to local productivity conditions. From Proposition 1 we derive the following
central hypotheses for our empirical analysis:
Hypothesis 1: Under firm-level contracts and in uncovered firms (regimes (I)
and (D)), firm-specific productivity should to have a positive impact on wages,
whereas under industry-level contracts (regime (C)) wages are expected to be com-
pletely insensitive to local productivity conditions.
Hypothesis 2: Under industry-level contracts (regime (C)) we expect wages
to be negatively related to the degree of firm heterogeneity in the industry under
consideration, whereas under firm-level contracts and in uncovered firms (regimes
(I) and (D)) the degree of firm heterogeneity should have no impact on wages.
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data and Variable Description
The data used in this paper are taken from the IAB Linked Employer-Employee
Panel (LIAB) which combines data from the IAB-Establishment Panel and the Em-
ployment Statistics Register (see e.g. Alda et al. 2005). The IAB-Establishment
Panel is based on an annual survey of German establishments, whose sampling
frame encompasses all German establishments that employ at least one employee
paying social security contributions. The individual data stem from the Employ-
ment Statistics Register, which is an administrative data set based on reports from
employers in compliance with the notifying procedure for the German social security
system. This procedure obliges employers to provide a notification at the beginning
and the end of each employment relationship for all employees who are covered
by the German social security system. In addition, there is at least one annual
compulsory notification on the 31st December of each year.
To construct the linked employer-employee data set, we first select establishments
from the IAB-Establishment Panel. The establishment data span from 1995 to
2005 and give detailed information on a great deal of establishment characteristics,
such as establishment size, collective bargaining coverage and the existence of a
works council. As to collective bargaining coverage, establishments are asked to
report whether they are bound to an industry-wide collective wage agreement or,
alternatively, to a firm-specific wage agreement.6 A more detailed description of the
remaining establishment variables is provided in Guertzgen (2005, 2006).
To operationalise the theoretical model’s source of firm heterogeneity, we com-
pute establishment-specific per-capita value-added as a measure for firm-specific pro-
ductivity conditions. Per capita value-added is calculated as the difference between
annual sales and material costs divided by establishment size. We then proceed
to construct a measure of firm heterogeneity at the industry-level. From the theo-
retical analysis in Section 3 it is clear that an ideal measure of firm heterogeneity
would exactly refer to those industries that are covered by the specific industry-level
agreements. However, the data only provide information on coverage at the industry
or firm-level and lack explicit information the specific contract an establishment is
6Moreover, since 1999 establishments without any binding collective contract are asked whether
they follow informally the terms of an industry-wide agreement. However, for the available waves
respondents are not asked to provide any information on the precise nature of the voluntarily
applied contract terms. As a result, the informational content of this question remains rather
elusive.
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subject to. For this reason, we have to resort to the two-digit industry-level classi-
fication (WZ93) provided by the establishment data in order to obtain a reasonable
classification for the measure of firm heterogeneity at the industry-level. On the
basis of this classification, we compute the mean, the standard deviation and the
coefficient of variation of value-added for each of the two-digit industries separately
for eastern and western Germany and for each year of the time period under con-
sideration.7 Table 2 displays for each of the two-digit industries mean and standard
deviation of per-capita value-added averaged over all time periods from 1995 to 2004
separately for western and eastern Germany. The figures indicate that among the
industries that are characterised by a relatively high degree of heterogeneity are the
western Chemicals, Coke and Petroleum industry as well as Food, Beverages and
Tobacco in both western and eastern Germany. Sectors that appear to be compa-
rably homogeneous are most notably the Basic and Fabricated Metal industries.As
Table 2: Dispersion of value-added in two-digit industries
Two-Digit Industry MEAN SD CV MEAN SD CV
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Mining, energy, water supply 1.311 1.431 1.07 0.833 0.749 0.86
Food, beverages, tobacco 0.630 0.984 1.58 0.446 0.819 1.82
Textiles and leather 0.548 0.477 0.86 0.293 0.302 1.04
Pulp, paper, publishing 0.652 0.638 0.98 0.541 0.595 1.03
Wood (excluding furniture) 0.497 0.386 0.76 0.297 0.278 0.93
Chemicals, coke, petroleum 1.152 1.448 1.22 0.682 0.598 0.87
Rubber and plastic products 0.650 0.459 0.70 0.467 0.411 0.87
Non-metallic mineral products 0.589 0.499 0.82 0.432 0.378 0.88
Basic metals 0.658 0.460 0.70 0.428 0.278 0.65
Fabricated metals 0.578 0.368 0.63 0.398 0.373 0.92
Machinery 0.756 0.640 0.81 0.470 0.341 0.73
Motor vehicles 0.853 0.810 0.87 0.484 0.412 0.85
Other transport equipment 0.832 0.585 0.69 0.425 0.329 0.77
Electrical equipment 0.864 0.907 1.03 0.495 0.437 0.86
Optical equipment 0.585 0.390 0.72 0.339 0.266 0.78
Furniture, N.E.C. 0.449 0.280 0.62 0.257 0.161 0.62
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1995-2005.
Mean and standard deviation of per-capita value-added are measured in 100.000 e.
7 Strictly speaking, the theoretical model establishes a relationship between wages and the
variability in the labour-input coefficient, the inverse of value-added. In what follows, we consider
the variability in value-added as the use of the inverse of value-added would result in a division
by zero for a number of observations. Moreover, it can be shown that a second-order Taylor
approximation of V ar(1/x) is 1x2 · (V ar(x)x2 − (V ar(x)x2 )2) . Hence, with a coefficient of variation of x
smaller than one, V ar(1/x) is a monotonic transformation of V ar(x).
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we apply panel data methods, the final estimation sample comprises establishments
with consistent information on the establishment characteristics of interest (see Ta-
ble A1 in the appendix) and at least two consecutive time series observations. In
a second step, we merge the establishment panel data with individual data for the
entire population of workers who are employed by the selected establishments by
using a unique establishment identifier which is available from both data sets. In
particular, the data allow us to merge the selected establishment data with notifi-
cations for all those employment spells comprising the June 30th of each year. From
the individual data we keep individuals with at least two consecutive time-series
observations.8 The final linked sample comprises 816,227 individuals in 3,358 es-
tablishments with a total of 3,370,807 individual observations. The individual data
provide information on the gross daily wage, age, gender, nationality, employment
status (blue/white-collar), educational status (six categories) and on the date of
entry into the establishment. Table A1 in the appendix presents summary statistics
for the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
4.2 Results
In order to quantify the relationship between the degree of firm heterogeneity and
wages across different wage-setting regimes, we consider the following wage equation:
lnwijt = µ+β ·SD V ALUEkt+γ ·MEAN V ALUEkt+ δ ·x′ijt+λt ·Dt+ ²ijt. (13)
In eq. (13), j refers to the establishment that employs individual i at time t,
while the index k denotes the industry affiliation of establishment j. The explanatory
variable of main interest is the industry-specific standard deviation of value-added
(SD VALUE ) as a proxy for the degree of firm heterogeneity at the industry-level.
We control further for the industry-specific mean of value-added (MEAN VALUE )
as a proxy for the inverse of c and for a vector of additional individual and es-
tablishment covariates x′ijt. Time dummies Dt are included to capture common
macroeconomic effects, while ²ijt denotes an unobserved time-varying component.
Table 3 reports the results from estimating eq. 13) by Pooled OLS sepa-
rately by bargaining regime. The estimated coefficients on SD VALUE and on
MEAN VALUE are represented in row 1 and 2. Consistent with the predictions
8Further, we exclude observations for apprentices, part-time and homeworkers from the indi-
vidual data and drop individuals younger than 19 and older than 55. Moreover, as we consider
only full-time workers, we eliminate those whose wage is less than twice the lower social security
contribution limit.
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Table 3: POLS estimation results
Industry-level (C) No-coverage (D) Firm-level (I)
POOLED OLS ESTIMATES
SD VALUE -.015∗∗ 0.006 0.023∗ (0.011) -.009 (0.002)
MEAN VALUE 0.014 0.044 -.006 (0.068) 0.060 (0.111)
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
FEMALE -.205∗∗∗ (0.013) -.266∗∗∗ (0.007) -.206∗∗∗ (0.017)
AGE 0.022∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.024∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.024∗∗∗ (0.005)
AGE2 -.000∗∗∗ (0.000) -.000∗∗∗ (0.000) -.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
TENURE 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
TENURE2 -.000∗∗∗ (0.000) -.000∗∗∗ (0.000) -.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
FOREIGN -.003 (0.003) -.002 (0.005) 0.006 (0.010)
WHITECOLL 0.272∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.291∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.234∗∗∗ (0.026)
VOCATIO 0.077∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.079∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.076∗∗∗ (0.012)
HIGH SCHOOL 0.120∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.098∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.083∗∗∗ (0.021)
VOC-HIGH 0.120∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.150∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.110∗∗ (0.088)
TECHN-UNI 0.329∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.288∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.310∗∗∗ (0.023)
UNI 0.386∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.344∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.331∗∗∗ (0.026)
ESTABLISHMENT CHARACTERISTICS
log(SIZE) 0.029∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.047∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.050∗∗∗ (0.008)
VALUE 0.034∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.065∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.062∗∗∗ (0.020)
WCOUNCIL 0.088∗∗ (0.032) 0.051∗∗ (0.026) 0.055∗∗∗ (0.014)
K/L 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.008∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.004∗∗ (0.002)
Observations 2,766,702 343,702 260,403
Adj. R2 0.693 0.737 0.721
Source: LIAB 1995-2005.
Note: The dependent variable is the individual log real daily wage.
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the industry-level.
The models include 15 regional dummies, 16 industry dummies and 9 time dummies.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%-level, ∗∗Significant at 5%-level.
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from the theoretical model, SD VALUE enters the regression with its expected neg-
ative sign and is significant at the 5%-level under centralised contracts (C). On the
contrary, in uncovered plants SD VALUE enters with a positive and significant sign,
whereas under firm-level contracts the coefficient on SD VALUE is not significantly
different from zero. As shown in Table 3, these results are robust to the inclusion
of a number of individual and establishment controls. Because the coefficients on
these covariates are broadly consistent with what has been found earlier in the lit-
erature (Guertzgen 2005, 2006), we do no comment on these estimates further. The
coefficients on MEAN VALUE are estimated to be insignificant for each bargaining
regime. 9
Even though we have controlled for a large number of observable individual and
establishment characteristics, it might be conceivable that the negative association
between firm-heterogeneity and individual wages is due to sorting of unobservably
better workers and firms into more homogeneous industries. If this were the case,
the coefficient on SD VALUE would be downward biased. This potential bias raises
the question as to whether the pattern of previous results holds if unobserved firm
and worker effects are accounted for. An important concern is that the negative
association between firm heterogeneity and wages might be simply caused by a
potential downward-bias. To address this problem, we also estimate eq. (13) in
spell first-differences, i.e. after first-differencing eq. (13) within each individual-
establishment combination in order to eliminate unobserved plant and individual
heterogeneity. The results from this differenced specification are shown in Panel A
of Table 4. While the coefficients on SD VALUE exhibit a similar pattern as in
Table 3, the coefficient is found to be somewhat smaller (in absolute magnitude)
under industry-level contracts, but still negative and significant at the 10%-level.
Even though these findings indicate that the OLS estimates appears to be somewhat
downward biased, they still confirm the theoretical predictions suggesting a negative
association between firm heterogeneity and wages under centralised wage-setting.10
Thus far, the estimates are based upon the unweighted moments of per-capita
value-added, which do not account for the fact that large establishments are more
9Note that according to our theoretical results the relationship between the average industry
productivity and the negotiated wage is ambiguous for a given variablilty in productivity conditions
under industry-level contracts. See eq. (11) where the derivative of wC with respect to c is negative
only if V ar(c) < c2/(2(n+ 1)).
10To test the hypothesis that the wage moderating effect of between-firm heterogeneity should
be less relevant for above-average performing establishments, I have also included an interaction
between SD V ALUE and 1) a dummy variable indicating whether plants pay wages above the
going rate and 2) a dummy indicating whether an establishment’s value-added exceeds the industry-
average. Unfortunately, these interactions enter the equations with their expected positive (but
insignificant) signs only in case of the unweighted heterogeneity measure (Table 3).
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likely to be overrepresented in our dataset. As a robustness check, we therefore
also calculate the weighted mean and standard deviation of per-capita value-added,
where the weights are derived using the sample weights from the IAB Establishment
Panel.11 The results from re-running the specifications with these weighted moments
are shown in Panel B and C of Table 4. While the signs of the coefficients on
SD VALUE confirm the previous pattern of results as in Table 3 and Panel A,
MEAN VALUE now enters the equations with a positive sign and is found to be
weakly significant at the 10%-level in both the OLS and differenced specification.
In terms of the economic significance of the estimates, the results imply that a one-
standard deviation increase in SD VALUE (which is 0.402 in the unweighted and
69.33 in the weighted case)12 lowers wages by about 2 to 4 per cent.
Table 4: Robustness checks
Industry-level (C) No-coverage (D) Firm-level (I)
A. DIFFERENCED
SD VALUE -.005∗ (0.003) 0.005 (0.005) 0.004 (0.006)
MEAN VALUE -.003 (0.001) -.001 (0.002) -.001 (0.003)
B. OLS - WEIGHTED MOMENTS
SD VALUE -6.0e−05∗∗∗ (2.0e−05) 7.0e−05 (8.0e−05) -5.0 (4.0e−05)
MEAN VALUE 0.013∗ (0.006) -.001 (0.002) 0.030 (0.020)
C. DIFFERENCED - WEIGHTED MOMENTS
SD VALUE -3.0e−05∗ (1.6e−05) 1.3e−05 (2.0e−05) 1.8e−06 (1.3e−05)
MEAN VALUE 0.008∗ (0.004) -.004 (0.007) 0.005 (0.003)
Source: LIAB 1995-2005.
Note: The dependent variable is the individual log real daily wage. The differenced specifications
include all variables in first-differences. Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted
for clustering at the industry-level. The OLS models include 15 regional dummies, 16 industry
dummies and 9 time dummies (differenced 8 time dummies).
∗∗∗Significant at 1%-level, ∗∗Significant at 5%-level.
11The weights take into account that the IAB-Establishment Panel oversamples large estab-
lishments. In particular, the weighted mean of x is calculated as xw=
∑n
j=1 wj · xj , where
wj = hj/
∑n
j=1 hj with hj denoting the number of plants a particular observation is represen-
tative for. The weighted standard deviation is the square root of
∑n
j=1 wj · (xj − xw)2.
12See Table A1, which display the unweighted mean and standard deviation of SD V ALUE .
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5 Conclusions
The purpose of the present paper was to study the relationship between wages and
the degree of firm heterogeneity under different wage setting structures. To derive
testable hypotheses, we have set up a theoretical model that analyses the sensitiv-
ity of wages to the variability in productivity conditions in a unionised oligopoly
framework with centralised and decentralised wage determination structures. The
theoretical results predict wages to be negatively associated with the degree of firm
heterogeneity under centralised wage-setting, as unions internalise negative exter-
nalities of a wage increase for below-average performing firms. We have tested this
prediction using a linked employer-employee panel data set from the German min-
ing and manufacturing sector. Consistent with the hypotheses from our theoretical
model the empirical results suggest that, everything else equal, workers in more
heterogeneous sectors receive lower wages if wages are determined by industry-level
bargaining, whereas the degree of firm heterogeneity appears to have no impact on
wages in uncovered firms and under firm-level contracts. The results therefore sup-
port the notion that the internalisation of negative externalities is not only confined
to macroeconomic externalities, but may also extent to negative externalities that
concern adverse survival prospects of firms in the industry under consideration.
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6 Appendix
Proposition 1:
Regime (D) : With Ui = (wi − w)li = (wi − w)ciqi , i = 1, ..., n, the first-order
condition for each union i is
∂Ui
∂wi
= li +
∂li
∂wi
(wi − w) = ci
a− nwici +
∑
j 6=iwjcj
b(n+ 1)
− nc2i
(wi − w)
b(n+ 1)
= 0, (14)
yielding n reaction functions
wi =
a+ nciw +
∑
j 6=iwjcj
2nci
, i = 1, ..., n. (15)
Regime (I) : With U I =
∑n
j=1(wj − w)lj =
∑n
j=1(wj − w)cjqj , the first-order
condition for each wage wi is
∂U
∂wi
=
∂
∑n
j=1 Uj
∂wi
= (li +
∂li
∂wi
(wi − w) +
∑
j 6=i
∂Uj
∂wi
) = 0 (16)
⇔ ci
a− nwici +
∑
j 6=iwjcj
b(n+ 1)
− nc2i
(wi − w)
b(n+ 1)
+
∑
j 6=i
cicj
(wj − w)
b(n+ 1)
= 0, (17)
yielding n reaction functions
wi =
a+ nciw + 2
∑
j 6=iwjcj − w
∑
j 6=i cj
2nci
, i = 1, ..., n. (18)
Regime (C) : With UC =
∑n
j=1(w − w)lj =
∑n
j=1(w − w)cjqj, the first-order
condition for the uniform industry-wage w is
∂U
∂w
=
∂
∑n
j=1 Uj
∂w
= (
n∑
j=1
(lj + (w − w)∂lj
∂w
) = 0 (19)
⇔
n∑
j=1
cj
a− nwcj +
∑
i6=j wci
b(n+ 1)
+
cj(w − w)
b(n+ 1)
(−ncj +
∑
i6=j
ci) = 0. (20)
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